As economic concerns mounted
over the depletion of valuable fish stocks under ineffective traditional
fishery management systems that were seriously threatening national
economies, a
new approach to managing fisheries emerged in Iceland,
New Zealand and Australia
in
the 1970s through the development of the individual transferable quota
(ITQ)
fisheries management system, also known as the catch share program.
These early ITQ programs were
originally designed to improve economic performance, but it has since
been
discovered that the ITQ fishery management system enables the
rehabilitation of
the entire marine environment including marine habitats as well as fish
populations, while at the same time it significantly increases
fishermen’s
revenue, profits, safety, compliance with fisheries regulations and
employment
stability. The ITQ system also reduces bycatch which is the unintended
capture
of non-targeted marine life such as turtles, sharks, dolphins and seals
thereby
allowing these animals to continue living and contributing to balanced
and
healthy marine ecosystems of which they have historically been a part.
The ITQ system became so
successful that Canada
and
the U.S.
soon followed with their ITQ programs. By 2010, the U.S.
had developed ITQ fishery management systems for fisheries that
represent one
quarter of the total U.S.
commercial fisheries value that was reported to be annually worth US$4.1
billion in dockside value in 2009. Equally as important, the National
Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration responsible for the nation’s fisheries
published
a report for the U.S. Congress recommending the conversion of all
remaining U.S.
fisheries to the ITQ system as a means to
maximize the efficiency, profitability and long term sustainability of
the U.S.
fisheries.
Within an ITQ fishery management
system, the total annual catch of a commercial species is subdivided
into
portions, or shares, each of which represents a fixed percentage of the
total
annual catch that the holder of the share is guaranteed the right to
catch each
year. Initial shares are usually allocated by the regional governing
fisheries
authority to professional fishermen who have a history of fishing the
species
in question. Share allocations may be given in exchange for a price
corresponding to the value of the share or for little or no cost,
depending on
the decision of the governing fisheries authority. The value of a
fishery
depends on a number of factors including the population size,
reproductive capability,
health and distribution of the species that comprise the fishery. If the
fishery value increases, the fishermen’s share values correspondingly
increase
while the converse is true as well. It therefore inures to the
shareholders’
long term benefit to conduct their business in a manner that protects
the
natural marine resources on which their livelihoods are entirely
dependent.
One of the many benefits of this
system is the ability of a shareholder to sell or lease his shares. If
the
fishery value increases, then the value of the shares increases. This is
of
particular interest to fishermen who understand that the value of their
boat
decreases with age; however, if they contribute to enhanced fishery and,
therefore, share values, their reduced boat value can be offset by an
increased
share value. And share transferability means that the ITQ system is open
rather
than closed to new participants.
One reason why the ITQ system is
becoming more widely used in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres is
that the
ITQ system can be implemented in any type of fishery (e.g. single and
multi-species fisheries, fish, crustacean, etc.) in any region (i.e.
tropical,
temperate, sub-polar and polar) with all types of vessels (e.g.
industrial,
mid-size, small-scale).
Yet despite its universal
appeal, the ITQ system is not a one-size-fits-all system. On the
contrary, the
ITQ system is tailored to the needs of each region that it serves. For
example,
Aegean fishermen regularly fall victim to net damage and fish losses
from
dolphins and seals that intrude on fishermen’s catches in impoverished
marine
areas that are suffering from the reduced availability of prey due to
overfishing. Under the ITQ system, a management provision could be made
for the
replacement of verifiably damaged nets if the regional ITQ framework
reserved a
portion of the management fee for such an approved use.
One of the most distinguishing
features of this unique fisheries management system, which embodies a
new and
more reliable dimension of enforcement that does not exist under
traditional
fisheries management, is that ITQ management includes enforcement of
fisheries
regulations to ensure shareholder compliance and reduce illegal fishing
which
serves to protect share values and the marine environment. This
underlies the
prospect of greater profitability as fishermen acquire a direct stake in
the
overall health of the fishery which prompts them to shift their
incentives from
maximizing short term volume to maximizing long term value.
The Secretary General of the
Nordic Council of Ministers (who is also a former Prime Minister of
Iceland),
the Secretary General of Cepesca (the Spanish Fishing Association) and
others
with extensive economic experience in the fisheries industry have
ardently
advocated the introduction of the ITQ fisheries management system in
Europe as
a means of reversing the spiraling downfall of a once-proud industry
that has
impoverished the oceans which once served as cradles of life rather than
tombs
of extinction.
My partner and I joined in this
effort through our preparation and February 2010 delivery of a
socio-economic
Fisheries Reform Proposal to EU Commission President Barosso, EU
Fisheries Commissioner Damanaki, Members of the
European Parliament Fishery and Environment Committees, Hellenic
Ministers of
Agriculture and the Environment, the Chairman of the Environment
Committee of
the Union of Cycladic Municipalities and the President of the
Fishermen’s Union
of the Southern Aegean. Based on
remarkably positive statistical evidence from fisheries that converted
to ITQs
following dismal economic performance due to overfishing, this document
demonstrates each of the ways in which the ITQ system can satisfy the
aims of
EU Fisheries Commissioner Damanaki outlined during her 19 January 2010
confirmation hearing, including the reduction of overfishing as well as
fishing
overcapacity, increased fishing revenues and profitability, protection
of the
small-scale fishing industry, and the preservation of marine resources
on which
the fishermen exclusively depend for their future livelihoods.
The European Commission and its
advisors have already recognized the benefits of the ITQ system in the
Commission’s publication “Fisheries and Aquaculture in Europe”
(No. 47 April 2010) in which the Commission acknowledged that ITQs are
under
serious consideration as a framework for the new Common Fisheries
Policy. As
many European Member States have already fallen very far behind other
developed
nations in modernizing their fisheries for a profitable and sustainable
future,
it becomes increasingly important that we, as European citizens, inform
ourselves about the best way to protect our irreplaceable natural marine
resources, participate in the Common Fisheries Policy debate and thereby
make a
difference in our own future for which we as citizens, and not the
politicians,
are entirely responsible.
To receive a copy of the
Socio-Economic Fisheries Reform Study, please contact: Constantine Alexander